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STATE AND LAW 
 
All societies have a concept of marriage, and all therefore need rules to determine what 
counts as a marriage within that particular society and what does not.1 The creation and 
application of such rules requires a decision to be made as to the relative importance of 
the internal and external aspects of marriage: is it the intention of the parties to be 
married that matters most, or their compliance with certain stipulated rituals or 
formalities? And most fundamentally of all, who has the power to decide on what the 
rules are? 
 
Such questions are key to the history of marriage in the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries. Across the globe, as empires rose and fell, the rules as to what was required 
for a valid marriage in any given place were subject to change. Revolutions and political 
crises led to the authority to decide what constituted a marriage being suddenly 
transferred from religious authorities to the state, or vice versa. The creation of new 
nation-states required decisions to be made as to the relative importance of unity and 
the perhaps very different religious and cultural traditions of the territories being united. 
Similar dilemmas as to what should be recognised as a marriage were posed when 
imperial powers acquired more distant territories with even less familiar practices.2 
Even where a particular country did not experience political upheaval, the impacts of 
industrialisation, migration, increasing religious diversity, or simply the awareness of 
changes elsewhere led to changes in the ways marriages were regulated.  
 
These developments raised questions about the role of the state and the law, and about 
their relationship with religion, and with the individual. The answers, however, differed 
between different legal cultures. Western legal cultures were seen as being 
characterised by a strong connection between the law and the state: it was the state, and 
the state alone, that created law, and law that underpinned the operation of the state. 
This was the idea of “positive law” as defined by the nineteenth-century English legal 
philosopher John Austin, which saw law as the commands of a sovereign. Law was 
understood as an autonomous system, a set of rules that operated according to their own 
internal logic. Religious influences were not absent, but religion was not an independent 
source of law. In other legal cultures, by contrast, the law was both less individualistic 
and less autonomous, with religion playing a more significant role as a source of law.3 
 
In order to explore what role the state and the law played in the making of marriage this 
chapter will focus on the rules governing how couples could marry. After all, questions 
as to when a person is eligible to marry (in terms of their age and economic standing), 
who they can marry (in terms of gender and degrees of relatedness) and how many 
people they can marry (whether successively or simultaneously) tell us more about 
economic, social, and religious influences than about the role of the state and the law.  
 
The chapter is accordingly structured around four different models of marriage 
regulation. The first model is that of mandatory civil marriage as a form created by the 
state alone, whether to signal the authority of the state and downplay that of the church, 
to separate the functions of the state from the church, or as a convenient way of ensuring 
neutrality between different religious traditions within the state. The second model is 
of marriages co-created by state and religion through legislation setting the terms on 
which religious marriages would be recognized as legally binding. Such developments 
reflected the cultural importance of religion while reducing the power of religious 
institutions to determine the validity or otherwise of a marriage. These first two options 
were more likely to be found within Western legal cultures. Yet the rise of state control 
was not universal, as the third model of marriages determined by religious rites and 
authority will show: within Islamic, Asian, and African legal cultures, entry into 
marriage continued to be governed by the religious affiliation of the couple. The fourth 
model is that of marriages created by the actions of the parties alone but recognized by 
the state: jurisdictions where marriages could be created without any ceremony at all 
were to be found within very different legal cultures, thus confounding any neat 
categorization or perceived hierarchy. 
 
Within each section the aim is not to provide a comprehensive list of all of the 
jurisdictions that adopted a particular model but rather to illustrate different ways in 
which each of these models operated. The details of the precise processes that had to 
be followed in the making of a marriage will also be kept to a minimum, save where 
they are particularly illuminating about the aims of the law-makers or the balance that 
was struck between different religious groups. The extent to which the laws were 
observed in practice also falls outside the scope of this chapter, save where popular 
opposition led to a speedy reversal of official policy or where particular cultural 
practices themselves shaped the law. But by paring down the discussion to the ways in 
which the balance between the state, the law, religion, and the individual was struck it 
will be possible to achieve a far greater global reach than would otherwise be possible 
in a single chapter. 
 
 
STATE-CREATED MARRIAGE  
 
In earlier centuries Protestant reformers such as Luther and Calvin had championed 
making marriage a civil matter, and Enlightenment philosophers had declared marriage 
to be a civil contract.4 But the introduction of civil marriage did not necessarily reflect 
a culture of secularism, at least at a popular level. Instead, it could be used tactically, 
providing a neutral alternative in religiously diverse countries, a means of combating 
the power of the church within the state or of reducing the influence of supra-national 
religious organisations outside the state, or as a shorthand for signalling the modernity 
of the state and its alignment with the individualism and rationalism of Western legal 
culture. It was thus no coincidence that the advent of civil marriage tended to follow 
fundamental changes to the state itself, through revolution, renewal, or the reallocation 
of authority.  
Within this section, three different approaches to civil marriage will be considered: first, 
where it was part of a deliberate policy of secularisation; second, where it was used to 
create unity; and third, where it was opposed and speedily reversed.  
Secularisation and loyalty to the state 
In 1791 Revolutionary France had declared that “the law considers marriage to be only 
a civil contract” and prescribed that civil marriage would be the only legally recognised 
form of marriage. This was accompanied a year later by civil registration of marriages, 
as well as of births and deaths.5 Marriage, it was thought, was “a contract worthy of the 
keenest interest… because it has individual happiness as its goal and also influences 
the power and splendour of Empires.”6 The requirement of a compulsory civil marriage 
was duly enshrined in the Civil Code of 1804, with the aim of using the ceremony to 
create an emotional link between the citizen and the state being reflected in the 
incorporation of a degree of ritual, comparable to that of a religious ceremony.7 The 
marriage was required to take place at the town hall, in the presence of four (male) 
witnesses, where the officer responsible for celebrating the marriage would read to the 
parties the relevant parts of the Civil Code setting out their respective rights and duties 
within marriage.8 This provided a means of not only informing the parties but also 
transmitting the state’s ideology of marriage.9 
The fact that marriage was now “available as a civil right for all rather than as a 
privilege for those of the same confession”10 was seen as a marker of progress. 
Everyone was now equal before the law in terms of their ability to contract a legally 
recognised marriage, and the state stood as guarantor of the validity of the union. In 
return, it demanded compliance with a single set of rules and denied recognition to what 
minority religious communities had regarded as binding unions. This had particular 
implications for Jewish communities within France. Prior to the Revolution they had 
been largely autonomous, but civil marriage “became a publicly required contract in a 
way that religious marriage could not be.”11 The autonomy of religious groups was 
therefore constrained, and their authority diminished. 
Over the course of the nineteenth century a number of other jurisdictions adopted civil 
marriage as part of a more general process of secularisation, including the Netherlands 
and the newly independent state of Belgium.12 On the other side of the globe, as the 
Spanish Empire crumbled, its former colonies sought to shake off the influence of the 
Catholic Church by introducing civil marriage. Mexico made mandatory civil marriage 
a requirement in 1859, as part of a package of reforms intended to establish a secular 
state.13 A political crisis sparked the introduction of civil marriage in Chile in 1884, 
despite the fact that Catholicism had been adopted as the official religion of the new 
republic in 1828.14 And in Brazil, as in Revolutionary France, civil marriage was 
introduced as one of the first acts of the new Republic in 1889.15  
Further dramatic change occurred during the early years of the twentieth century. 
Republican Portugal introduced civil marriage in 1910, following the revolution of that 
year. And right at the end of our period, civil marriage became the only form of legal 
marriage in those parts of Russia under Bolshevik control, just two months after they 
seized power in 1917.16 The establishment of a regime that not only sought a separation 
between the state and religion but was avowedly atheist was very much an imposition 
on traditional culture, the Russian Empire having “almost completely missed” the 
reforms to marriage law that were happening elsewhere in Europe in the nineteenth 
century.17  
Unification and uniformity 
The unification of Italy in 1860 and Germany in 1871 provided the catalyst for the 
introduction of mandatory civil marriage in both states. In neither was this form of 
marriage entirely novel. The northern Italian states had fallen under the control of 
France in the early nineteenth century and had followed its lead in making civil 
marriage a legal requirement, although religious control over marriage had been largely 
restored upon the Restoration of the Bourbon monarchy in 1815. Large parts of 
Germany had similarly been under the control of the French Empire, and over the 
course of the nineteenth century a number of German states introduced civil marriage 
either as an option or, occasionally, as a mandatory requirement.  
In both Italy and Germany the introduction of a single form of marriage was intended 
to emphasize the unity of the newly created state. Both enacted new Civil Codes 
relatively quickly after unification, with the Italian Civil Code being enacted as early 
as 1865. In Germany mandatory civil marriage was introduced by imperial act in 1875, 
and confirmed by the newly drafted civil code in 1900, thereby also concluding a long-
standing debate as to the appropriate form and function of the law in favour of 
uniformity as opposed to principles based on different cultural traditions.18 
However, the religious traditions within the now unified states provided rather different 
reasons for opting for civil marriage in each case. In predominantly Catholic Italy, civil 
marriage symbolically emphasised the new state’s “liberty from foreign influence and 
Church domination.”19 In Germany, by contrast, civil marriage was a practical solution, 
a way of ensuring consistency and neutrality in the face of the mixed Catholic and 
Protestant heritage of different states.  
The justification of national unity could be used even where the state had not gone 
through any dramatic change in its constitution. In the religiously and linguistically 
diverse Kingdom of Hungary, the introduction of civil marriage in 1894 was depicted 
as a symbol of modernity, liberalism, and national unity.20 This was vividly illustrated 
by the first civil marriage in the city of Komarom, at which the bride and groom 
demonstrated their patriotism by wearing Hungarian dress, while the officiant sported 
a tricolour sash and declared that “[t]he unity of the political nation can only be 
achieved if the family itself is the basis of state existence, if marriage is placed under 
uniform state law.”21 
Opposition and reversals 
Just as revolutions and political crises might lead to civil marriage being established as 
a symbol of a break with the past, so too opposition to such changes might lead to an 
equally symbolic restoration of religious marriage to demonstrate continuity and 
stability when power changed hands once again.  
In Spain, for example, the 1868 revolution led to the introduction of mandatory civil 
marriage in 1870.22 Four years later, the new Republic was overthrown, and the 
possibility of marrying in a religious ceremony was restored.23 In addition, any 
marriages that had been solemnised according to religious rites during the period of 
mandatory civil marriage were retrospectively validated.24 By this means the state 
demonstrated its support for those who had adhered to their own religious traditions 
rather than complying with what had proved to be merely a temporary law. Even 
establishing civil marriage as an option later proved to be a challenge. In the subsequent 
Civil Code of 1889, Catholics were required to solemnise their marriage in a religious 
ceremony; civil marriage was only available for those who declared that they were not 
Catholics.25 An attempt was made in 1906 to remove this requirement and make civil 
marriage available to all, at least as an option, but following opposition this measure 
was revoked two years later.26 
In Cuba, too, as it was transferred from being a colony of Spain to a protectorate of the 
US in 1898, civil marriage was briefly the only form of marriage recognised by the 
state, the new law being supported by nationalists as “eradicating the Spanish colonial 
legacy, and verifying national sovereignty.”27 In this case, however, opposition from 
the Catholic Church led to a swift reversal of policy and the acceptance of religious 
marriages as equally valid.  
Overall, the introduction of civil marriage can be seen as being in opposition to existing 
cultural practices, but with the aim of shaping a new, modern, and secular system in 
which the state, rather than a religious authority, formed a third party to the marriage 
contract. Yet its introduction in a variety of different states, and its absence from other 
equally developed states, should make us pause before drawing any correlation between 
particular forms of legal culture and particular forms of marriage. There were still many 
other states within Western legal culture that did not even offer the option of civil 
marriage, instead requiring a form of religious ceremony to establish a legally binding 
marriage. Yet here too the increasing role of the state was to be seen in the way that the 
legitimacy of the religious ceremony was increasingly established and constrained by 
law, as the next section will show. 
 
STATES DETERMINING THE STATUS OF RELIGIOUS MARRIAGES 
 
Across the period there was an increasing tendency for states to legislate to set the terms 
on which religious marriages would be recognized as legally binding. While reflecting 
the cultural importance of the wedding as a religious rite, this tactic of legislating for 
religious marriage made it clear that it was the state that was the ultimate arbiter and 
guarantor of validity.28 This was reflected in the definitions of marriage offered by one 
English judge, Sir William Scott, in the early nineteenth century. He suggested that 
within civil society marriage became “a civil contract regulated and prescribed by law 
and endowed with civil consequences” but added—probably mindful of developments 
across the Channel—that “[i]n most civilized countries acting under a sense of the force 
of sacred obligations, it has had the sanctions of religion superadded: it then becomes a 
religious as well as a natural and civil contract; for it is a great mistake to suppose that 
because it is the one therefore it may not likewise be the other.”29 This acknowledged 
the importance of religion while subtly downplaying it as something additional to state-
made law.  
 
The downplaying of religious authority was reflected in the extension of formal 
recognition to a number of different religious routes, diminishing the importance of any 
single religious body within the state. Religion was increasingly classified as a private 
matter, as “classical liberal theory made sense of the diversity of individual religious 
beliefs by restricting them to the private while freeing the public to be ordered 
according to secular reason.”30 Such developments also provided a reason for the formal 
transfer of the jurisdiction to determine what constituted a valid legal marriage from 
the church and its courts to secular courts: if religion was to be a private matter, and 
different religions treated alike, it was problematic to leave the courts of any given 
religion to determine the civil status of a couple.  
 
Within this model, three different approaches will be considered: first, legislating to 
allow for a number of different religious routes into marriage that had not previously 
existed; second, recognizing existing religious marriages and bringing them within a 
formal framework; and third, facilitating mixed marriages.  
 
Legislating for multiple types of religious marriages  
 
The marriage laws of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland—itself a new 
political creation—illustrate just how complex the relationship between the state, law, 
and religion could be. In 1800 there was one state and one Parliament but three different 
legal systems, multiple religious denominations, and overlapping but distinct 
approaches to the regulation of marriage.  
 
Within England and Wales, the state had already begun to impinge on the church’s 
control over marriage during the eighteenth century, but the changes that occurred over 
the course of the nineteenth century were far more radical. The Clandestine Marriages 
Act of 1753 had done little more than enshrine the requirements of the canon law in 
statute, albeit with new and harsher penalties for those who failed to comply with 
certain key requirements. The church courts had retained their power to adjudicate on 
the validity of marriages, and all except Quakers and Jews were expected to marry 
according to the rites of the established church, the Church of England.31 Even in this 
period, then, state and religion were very much intertwined in the regulation of 
marriage.  
 
Changes were motivated by the growth of nonconformity in the nineteenth century, 
although significantly it was only once adherence to the Anglican church was no longer 
a prerequisite for participation in public life that Protestant Nonconformists and 
Catholics were able to marry according to their own rites. These religious developments 
coincided with a new interest on the part of the state in ensuring better recording of key 
demographic events, and with a new administrative machinery that would be able to 
implement it. Reforms to the Poor Law had already divided the country into a number 
of civil districts that could be used as the basis for a new system. As the state took on 
more functions, it became all the more important to have such information about its 
inhabitants.  
 
The resulting Marriage Act of 1836 provides a particularly interesting model of 
regulation combining increased state power with deference to the established church, 
recognition of religious diversity, and a desire to allow for a civil option that could be 
used by those of any religion or none. All those marrying other than according to non-
Anglican rites, including Jews and Quakers, had to give notice to a state official, the 
superintendent registrar. There was even an attempt to introduce universal civil 
preliminaries, but this was strongly resisted by the Church of England and banns and 
licences were retained as legal preliminaries to the Anglican service.  
 
When it came to the celebration of the marriage, the degree of regulation differed 
between different types of marriages. Anglican marriages continued to take place in the 
parish church, and Jewish and Quaker marriages in their own places of worship. Outside 
these groups, the diversity of dissent was such that devolving the power to conduct 
marriages to religious groups was not really an option. The compromise was to license 
individual buildings that were used as places of worship: if twenty householders 
confirmed that they used a particular building as their regular place of worship, it could 
be registered as a place where marriages could be celebrated. In this respect the state 
could supervise exactly where marriages were being celebrated. Civil marriages, 
meanwhile, took place in the office of a superintendent registrar. 
 
State control was further asserted by stipulating that all marriages should be centrally 
registered; responsibility for registration was devolved in the case of Anglican, Jewish, 
and Quaker marriages, but all other marriages, whether civil or religious, had to be 
attended by a civil registrar. It was not until the close of the century that other religious 
groups won the right to register their own marriages. 
 
In England and Wales the 1836 Act formed the basis for the evolution of new marriage 
rites. After all, Protestant Nonconformists—the Quakers excepted—had previously 
married in the Church of England rather than developing their own nuptial rites outside 
the legal system. English Catholics, too, had usually gone through an Anglican 
ceremony in addition to the Catholic rite, although by the 1830s concern had grown 
that the increasing number of Irish Catholic immigrants were marrying according to 
their own rites and were thus not married in the eyes of the law. In this respect the 1836 
Act brought new legal and religious practices into existence.  
 
Recognising religious practices 
 
Elsewhere, by contrast, the state began to recognise existing religious practices and 
bring them within the ambit of legislation. This was the case in Ireland, with its minority 
established church, majority Catholic population, and strong strand of Presbyterianism. 
The Marriages (Ireland) Act 1844 was modelled on the 1836 Marriage Act in England 
and Wales, but differed from the latter in giving Presbyterian marriages special 
recognition, alongside those conducted in the Established Church or according to 
Quaker or Jewish rites. Members of other religious denominations were permitted to 
marry according to their own rites in buildings registered for the purpose,32 but Catholic 
marriages were specifically excluded from this provision and therefore remained 
governed by the canon law. It took another 19 years for Catholic marriages to be 
brought within the legal framework of the state and even then there was little 
interference with the actual ceremony. Instead, couples were required to obtain a 
certificate in advance of the wedding and to register the completed certificate 
afterwards, although such registration was not essential to the validity of the marriage. 
In this way the state recognised and extended its authority over existing religious 
marriages with minimal change to the way in which such marriages were celebrated. 
 
In Scotland, the position was still more complex. While the state recognised a broader 
range of religious marriages over the course of the nineteenth century, the changes 
related to what was recognised as a regular marriage, rather than what would be 
recognised as a valid marriage. At the start of the nineteenth century the only marriages 
recognised as regular were those celebrated before a minister of the Church of Scotland 
after banns had been called. At the same time, the law held that all that was needed for 
a valid marriage was the freely expressed consent of the two people involved and 
presumed that such consent had been given where the couple had sex following an 
earlier promise to marry, or where they lived together and were reputed to be husband 
and wife. Over the decades that followed, the incursions by the state onto this landscape 
of restricted options for regularity and almost infinite options for irregularity were 
relatively limited. Legislation passed in 1834 provided that clergy of any denomination 
could celebrate a regular marriage, but the requirement that banns be read in the parish 
church remained in order to provide a degree of uniformity. Civil registration was not 
introduced until 1855, almost two decades after its advent in England and Wales, and 
giving notice to the local registrar as an alternative to having banns called only became 
an option in 1878.33 Nor was there any formal option of civil marriage, although the 
option of registering an irregular marriage has been seen as an effective alternative.  
 
The variety of marriage laws within the United Kingdom, and the role played by 
missionaries of all denominations within the burgeoning British Empire, also meant 
that it was necessary for Parliament to legislate to ensure the legal recognition of 
marriages conducted in British possessions overseas according to different religious 
rites. As early as 1818, legislation established that marriages conducted in India by 
ordained ministers of the Church of Scotland should have the same force as those 
solemnized by clergymen of the Church of England.34 By mid-century a broader 
approach proved necessary to ensure the validity of marriages conducted by 
Nonconformist ministers or by laymen acting under the authority of the Governor 
General.35 Modelled on the provisions of the 1836 Marriage Act, the 1851 Act for 
Marriages in India permitted couples to marry “according to such Form and Ceremony 
as they may see fit to adopt” as long as they had given notice to, and exchanged 
stipulated vows in the presence of, a Marriage Registrar.36 This, however, was explicitly 
limited to marriages “where One or both of the Parties is or are a Person or Persons 
professing the Christian Religion”,37 so as not to impinge on the privileges of other 
religious groups to determine what constituted a marriage. Just over twenty years later, 
further legislation was passed to allow marriage before a civil registrar for those 
declaring that they did not profess Christian, Hindu, Muslim, Buddhist, Parsi, Sikh, 
Jaina, or Jewish beliefs,38 in order to provide an option for breakaway religious groups 
whose marriage rites did not conform to previous usages.39 
 
Issues as to the recognition of marriages according to different religious rites also arose 
in the new Australian colonies, as the relationship between English law and the different 
religious traditions of the United Kingdom had to be worked out in the context of a 
society formed of former convicts and free settlers. The assumption that English law 
was applied so far as it could be was given statutory effect in legislation in 1828.40 But 
an earlier local ordinance had specifically provided that existing marriages solemnised 
by ministers of the Church of Scotland or Roman Catholic priests would have the same 
force as those solemnised by clergymen of the Church of England, which would not 
have been the case in England and Wales at that time,41 and there is ample evidence of 
marriages having been conducted according to Catholic or Presbyterian rites with the 
full knowledge and apparent approval of the colonial authorities.42 When put to the 
test—in the context of a prosecution for bigamy—it was held that a Catholic marriage 
would be recognised as valid. In so deciding, Francis Forbes, the Chief Justice of New 
South Wales, made a direct link between the nature of the state and the laws that would 
be appropriate to that state, noting that Parliament could not have intended “to force the 
whole mass of English laws—the laws of an old and settled society… to apply all… at 
once to an infant community.” The litigation led to more systematic regulation of the 
law of marriage, with legislation being passed to confirm the validity of existing 
marriages and set out what was required for future ones. Again, the role of the state 
here was limited to the recognition rather than the creation of marriage practices.  
 
Legislation was also passed to allow for a range of routes to marriage within British 
North America. Local conditions heavily influenced the terms of an 1817 statute stating 
that marriages in Newfoundland would be void unless solemnised by a person in holy 
orders, unless they had been celebrated “under Circumstances of peculiar and extreme 
Difficulty in procuring a Person in Holy Orders to perform the Ceremony.”43 More 
precise provision was made by legislation in 1824 allowing licences to be granted to 
religious teachers or preachers to conduct marriages where it was not practicable for 
the parties to be married in the Anglican church, with those who exceeded their 
authority and celebrated marriages where no such difficulty existed being subject to 
fines.44 Ontario, too, saw the emergence of a number of different routes into marriage. 
At the start of the nineteenth century it had recognised only marriages conducted 
according to the rites of the Church of England, but ministers from other Christian 
denominations acquired the right to solemnise marriages in 1847, and from 1857 all 
religious marriages were recognised.45 Upon the confederation of Canada in 1867, its 
various provinces retained the power to regulate the solemnization of marriages, in 
order to allay the anxieties of Quebec’s Catholic population.46  
 
Legislating for mixed marriages 
 
The fact that a state recognised different religious routes to marriage as legally valid 
did not necessarily ensure that these different routes were available to all. What if the 
parties to the marriage were of different religious faiths? Many religions had 
traditionally forbidden mixed marriages: should the state endorse that, override it, or 
sidestep it by providing a civil alternative? And what if it had simply overlooked the 
possibility of a particular combination? 
 
Nineteenth-century Irish marriage law provides an excellent case-study of both 
legislative gaps and changing attitudes to mixed marriages. In the eighteenth century 
Irish law had taken the step of recognising marriages celebrated by Presbyterian 
ministers—as long as the marriage was celebrated between two Protestant dissenters.47 
It had not, however, specified the effect of a marriage celebrated by a Presbyterian 
minister where one of the parties was a member of the established church. In 1844 this 
omission led to the controversial acquittal of one George Millis in a high-profile bigamy 
trial: as a member of the established Church of Ireland, his first marriage, having been 
conducted by a Presbyterian minister in Ireland, was regarded as being no marriage at 
all.48 The result caused considerable consternation, and legislation proved necessary to 
validate the marriages of those who had gone through similar ceremonies and to place 
the law of marriage on a more certain footing for the future. 
 
The validity of marriages between Catholics and Protestants similarly depended on how 
it was celebrated. If it was conducted by an Anglican clergyman it was valid; i f it was 
conducted by a Catholic priest it was void. Those who converted to Catholicism upon 
marriage might find themselves in a particularly difficult position, since the legislation 
also invalidated any marriage conducted by a Catholic priest between a Catholic and 
anyone who had been a Protestant within the year prior to the marriage. Wilkie Collins 
drew on this particularly harsh provision in his 1870 novel Man and Wife. In its opening 
pages we see a woman being spurned by the man she believes is her husband upon it 
being discovered that their marriage in Ireland was invalid, he having converted to 
Catholicism only shortly before their wedding.  
 
The publication of the novel coincided with legislation finally addressing this particular 
issue, following a real-life case that had attracted much publicity and a storm of protest 
about the state of the law. Theresa Longworth, an Englishwoman, claimed that she had 
actually gone through two ceremonies of marriage with Major Yelverton—the first in 
Scotland, by a private exchange of consent; the second before a Catholic priest in 
Ireland. But the House of Lords decided that there was insufficient evident of the first 
and that, as a Protestant, Major Yelverton could not have been validly married by a 
Catholic priest in Ireland. As one commentator noted, “in a nation of many intermingled 
creeds, it would surely be wiser to nullify marriages on account of the colour of the hair 
of the parties than to do so upon the score of their religion.”49 The outcry generated by 
the case was one of the factors leading to the establishment of a Royal Commission to 
examine the laws of marriage in 1865. The disestablishment of the Church of Ireland 
in 1869 provided a further spur to action and the Matrimonial Causes and Marriage 
Law (Ireland) Amendment Act 1870 finally allowed mixed marriages of Protestants 
and Catholics to be celebrated according to the rites of either. 
 
Elsewhere, civil marriage was introduced specifically to provide a means for those of 
different faiths to marry rather than as a neutral option open to all. In Sweden, religious 
plurality had existed since the late eighteenth century. Marriages had previously been 
required to be celebrated in the Lutheran church, but first other Christian denominations 
and then Jewish communities were also authorised to marry couples.50 When an option 
of civil marriage was introduced in 1863, it was only for those of different faiths who 
could not take advantage of any of the existing religious forms.51  
 
Yet while in many states marriage was directly regulated through specific legislation, 
in others religious authorities retained jurisdiction over what made a marriage, as the 
next section will show.  
 
 
REGULATION OF MARRIAGES BY RELIGIOUS AUTHORITIES 
 
There were a variety of different ways in which marriages might be regulated by 
religious authorities. Within any given state, there might be one recognised religious 
authority or several. That religious authority might be either primarily domestic, 
associated with just one state, or transnational. The Catholic Church provides a good 
example of the latter, although its hold over the regulation of marriage in both Europe 
and South America was diminishing over the course of the period. As European powers 
expanded their overseas empires in Africa and Asia, the religious diversity of the 
colonized peoples meant that attempts to impose a single mode of marrying were 
unlikely to meet with success, and the personal laws of such peoples largely continued 
to govern how they married.  
 
This section will consider first the links between religious authority and the identity of 
the state, then the way in which religious autonomy might both mute and support claims 
to territorial independence, and finally the intersection between law, religion and 
custom.  
 
Religion and the identity of the state 
 
The widespread adoption of civil marriage, and the introduction of state laws governing 
religious marriages, might suggest that there was a smooth and inevitable shift of power 
from religious authorities to the state. In reality, the relationship was more complex. 
States might wish to draw strength and support from religious authorities, or make a 
connection between religious and national identity, as the examples of Austria and the 
Ottoman Empire illustrate.  
 
Austria provides a good example not only of how power struggles between state and 
church might lead to jurisdiction being transferred back and forth, but also of how a 
state might be pursuing its own agenda in ceding jurisdiction to religious authorities. 
Jurisdiction over marriage had been transferred to the state in the late eighteenth 
century, and the Civil Code of 1811 maintained this approach. Marriages continued to 
be conducted by priests, but it was the state that decided what constituted a marriage. 
After the revolution of 1848, however, the Concordat of 1855 transferred jurisdiction 
back to the Catholic Church. As Ulrike Harmat has described, the close co-operation 
between state and church at this time meant that each began “to identify with the 
respective aims of the other”, with the Crown and government beginning “to conceive 
of Austria as ‘the Catholic great power.’” A little over a decade later, however, 
jurisdiction over marriage was transferred back to the state once more following a new 
constitution in 1867.52  
 
Religion was also central to the identity of the Ottoman Empire, which operated under 
Islamic law, and religious norms were particularly important in regulating entry into 
marriage. Islam regarded marriage as a contract, rather than as a sacrament, and the 
presence of an imam was not required in order for it to be regarded as valid. Nor was 
any particular ceremony or ritual necessary. While the nineteenth century saw reform 
in a number of areas of law, with codes inspired by European models being introduced, 
these did not extend to the area of family law.53 In that context, “the claims of the state 
as the originator of authoritative norms were attenuated by a proclaimed subordination 
to the norms of the shari’a as extrapolated, mostly, from the established and diverse 
jurisprudence (fiqh) of Muslim jurists.”54 By the start of the twentieth century, however, 
questions were raised about the need to reform the laws relating to marriage, and with 
the 1917 Ottoman Law of Family Rights “the state stepped up its regulation of the 
marital institution and self-consciously sought to bring the marriage practices of its 
citizens into sync with its vision of modernity.”55 In this case the role of religion was 
diminished not by internal or external power struggles but by a desire to project a 
different image of the state.  
 
Religious plurality  
 
While individuals within the Ottoman Empire had access to Islamic courts, this was not 
their only option. Given that “religious diversity was the norm rather than the 
exception”56 across its territories, the “millet” system had long been in operation. This 
left the regulation of marriage and other elements of family life were to be governed by 
the religious laws of the different religious communities, through agreements 
negotiated with their leaders.57   
 
While this permitted the exercise of cultural autonomy by these different communities 
and so muted potential opposition to the state, it could also be used to make claims for 
territorial autonomy. When Greece gained its independence from the Ottoman Empire 
in 1832, a strong link was made between religious and national identity: the Greeks 
were portrayed as a separate people “unified under the ‘garb of religious difference’” 
within the Ottoman Empire.58  
 
Religion, law and custom 
 
The ways in which marriages were regulated across the developing British Empire 
demonstrate the complex relationship between law, religion and custom. In India, for 
example, it had been established by the end of the eighteenth century that the regulation 
of marriage would be governed by the laws of the Qu’ran in the case of Muslims and, 
in the case of Hindus, by Sanskrit texts which the British colonial rulers called the 
Shaster.59 In the decades that followed, however, the limited understanding of the way 
in which Muslim and Hindu law had operated led to what was effectively a new body 
of law emerging,60 within a “a plural legal order that replicated the main features of 
European jurisdictional boundaries between canon law and state law.”61  
 
Religious plurality was if anything even greater in Africa. In those parts that came under 
British control, it had been the “multitude of indigenous tribal systems” that determined 
what constituted a marriage, with norms differing between tribes.62 African customary 
law was initially “dismissed by the early missionaries and colonial officials as a 
barbarous and inferior system of law.”63 Such attitudes were illustrated in the 1887 case 
of Re Bethell,64 in which the question to be decided by the English Court of Chancery 
was whether a marriage had taken place between an Englishman, Christopher Bethell, 
and a member of the Baralong tribe, named Teepoo. Christopher had travelled out to 
South Africa and taken up residence at Mafeking, among the Baralong tribe. He 
indicated that he wished to be part of the tribe, and to marry according to their customs. 
Evidence was given to the court that marriage according to Baralong custom required 
the bridegroom to slaughter a sheep, ox, or cow and give the head and hide to the bride’s 
parents before the marriage was consummated, but that no further ceremony was 
required, and that custom had been followed in this case. Those arguing for the validity 
of the marriage rested their case on the well-established legal principle that the validity 
of a marriage was to be determined by the law of the place where it took place. On the 
other side, however, it was argued that “[t]he Baralong tribe have not laws but only 
customs when they marry”—in other words, that the principle could not apply—and 
that unless there was a mutual exchange of consent “there cannot be that which English 
law recognises as marriage.”65 The judge, Justice Stirling, made it clear where his 
sympathies lay by interrupting on more than one occasion to ask whether the 
relationship described “was a marriage at all”66 and held that there was no marriage that 
the court could recognise, since the union described was “a marriage in the Baralong 
sense only”.67  
 
Despite such attitudes, with the adoption of the policy of “indirect rule”, African 
customary law was held to have a place within the formal legal system.68 But as in 
India, the process of recognition and incorporation was not value-neutral, whether in 
substance or in form, or in the way that it was transmitted, understood, or applied. Male 
elders who were identified as “chiefs” had a privileged position in describing customary 
law, and their version often enhanced their own authority.69 Colonial administrators 
translated fluid practices into specific rules.70 Practices that were regarded as 
“repugnant to justice and morality” were simply disregarded.71 A further layer of 
complication was added by the enactment of legislation creating optional procedures 
for entering into a marriage that would exist alongside customary and religious law.  
 
In New Zealand, meanwhile, ideas about law and marriage were entwined with a 
particular view of the emerging nation-state. Local ordinances were passed to regulate 
marriage relatively soon after it became a British colony but did not extend to the native 
Maori population, the assumption being that the latter would continue to marry 
according to their own laws. Yet before long, as Nan Seuffert has shown, there emerged 
a view of Maoris as primitive and uncivilised, without a system of law. The result was 
that the validity of Maori marriages fell to be determined by colonial laws: as one judge 
put it, “[t]here is only one marriage law in New Zealand for all races… and the so-
called marriage according to Maori custom is no marriage in law.”72 When the English 
courts were called upon to consider the validity of a marriage between an Englishman 
and an Aboriginal woman in Armitage v Armitage, the discussion of the pre-colonial 
position was decidedly cursory, it simply being noted that the “alleged husband” had 
said “that he was married according to the customs and usages then in force in New 
Zealand” but “there is no evidence before the Court of what those customs or usages 
were.”73 Further justification for non-recognition of Maori marriages by the state was 
found by linking Maori marriage laws with concubinage and polygamy, supposedly 
pre-modern concepts that could be unfavourably contrasted with “notions of civilisation 
and progress associated with the modern nation-state.”74  
 
Somewhat ironically, the perception of certain lands as “barbarous” also led to the 
English courts developing a concept of marriage which harked back to the “law of 
nature” and which was in many respects akin to a form of personal or religious law, 
albeit one justified in more nationalistic terms. In Ruding v Smith, Sir William Scott 
invoked the idea that there was a law higher than the law of the land, an ius gentium or 
a custom common to all nations. This, he thought, provided the basis for the recognition 
of Anglican marriages between English men and women “settled in countries 
professing a religion essentially different”.75 In that particular case the marriage had 
been celebrated at the Cape of Good Hope by the chaplain of the English forces, but 
the idea that the British took their own law with them was nonetheless quickly extended 
beyond British troops fighting overseas to all cases where there were deemed to be 
“insuperable difficulties” in complying with the local law,76 or where the British were 
establishing themselves in a country that was deemed to be “uninhabited” or 
“barbarous”. The validity of marriages conducted in such places fell to be determined 
by English common law, at least until it was supplanted by local regulation. Yet in 
holding that all that was required was an exchange of consent in words of the present 
tense, nineteenth-century judges misinterpreted what the English common law had 
required for a valid marriage before legislation was passed in 1753. It was nonetheless 
a convenient mistake, since it neatly side-stepped the requirement that marriages be 
conducted by an Anglican clergyman and recognised the role played by missionaries 
and ministers of all denominations across the British Empire.77  
 
So the recognition of religious marriages within a plural legal system was not confined 
to Asian, Islamic, and African legal cultures. But it operated very differently within the 
imperial context, as those versed in Western legal cultures tended to understand 
religious laws and customs through a particular lens. Religious laws were crystallized 
as formal law, while redefining the laws of indigenous peoples as “customs” enabled 
them to be displaced as a source of law altogether. The emphasis on personal laws also 
created barriers to intermarriage between those of different faiths. 
 
By contrast, developments elsewhere involved the emergence of a new form of 
marriage created with no ceremony at all, as the final section will demonstrate.  
 
 
LEGITIMACY WITHOUT STATE INTERVENTION 
 
In The History of Human Marriage, published in 1891, Edward Westermarck loftily 
proclaimed that “among primitive men marriage was, of course, contracted without any 
ceremony whatever; and this is still the case with many uncivilised peoples.”78 The 
linkage of “civilisation” and “ceremony”, and the assumption of a clear line of 
progression, was however complicated by the possibility of marrying in Scotland by a 
simple exchange of consent and by developments in the United States. 
 
At the start of the nineteenth century the newly independent United States was 
beginning to forge a new and distinctive American family law.79 Most states already 
provided for a choice of civil or religious marriage rites, but new developments were to 
make marriages even easier to enter into, with the concept of “common-law marriage” 
emerging in the New York case of Fenton v Reed in 1809. In allowing marriages to be 
entered into entirely informally, this new type of marriage both prioritised the choice 
of the couple over the laws of the state, and widened the state’s reach in terms of the 
imposition of obligations on husbands and wives.80 Its radicalism was obscured by the 
fact that it was presented as being rooted in English law, but while English law would 
indeed have regarded the fact that a couple had cohabited and were reputed to be 
married as evidence from which it might be presumed that a ceremony of marriage had 
taken place, it would not at the time have regarded a simple exchange of consent as 
amounting to a valid marriage.81  
 
Despite the novelty of the doctrine, a number of states subsequently adopted a concept 
of common law marriage82 and in Meister v Moore the US Supreme Court held that 
there was a “common-law right” to form a marriage by a simple exchange of consent. 
Acknowledging that statutes in many states regulated “the mode of entering into the 
contract”, it held that statutory provisions requiring a formal licence and ceremony were 
to be construed as merely directory unless the legislation made it explicit that a failure 
to observe such formalities would result in the invalidity of the marriage.  
 
Not all US states adopted the view that marriage laws were directory rather than 
mandatory. Massachusetts, Tennessee, North Carolina, and Maine never recognised 
any form of common law marriage. Even amongst those that did, there was a distinct 
lack of uniformity in how the courts determined when precisely a common law marriage 
might be held to have come into existence,83 and indeed in the types of states to adopt 
the concept.84 Over the course of the nineteenth century, statutory requirements were 
gradually relaxed only to be tightened again at its close. New provisions for the giving 
of notice before marriage and its registration once it had taken place were introduced 
by legislation.85 From the last quarter of the nineteenth century, states began to abolish 
common law marriage, and by 1920 it was only fully recognized in 26 states, and 
partially recognized in a further six.86  
 
The growing importance attached to the role of the state in the making of marriage was 
reflected in an 1892 decision of the Supreme Court of Washington, in which it was 
asserted that “[b]y adhering to the statutory provisions… parties are led to regard the 
contract as a sacred one, as one not lightly to be entered into, and are forcibly impressed 
with the idea that they are forming a relationship in which society has an interest, and 





In the early years of the nineteenth century, the German jurist Friedrich Carl von 
Savigny had argued that law could only be understood as part of culture: in his view, 
law was “first developed by custom and popular faith, next by jurisprudence—
everywhere, therefore, by internal silently-operating powers, not by the arbitrary will 
of a law-giver.” The Age of Empires saw many challenges to this idea of law as 
evolving in line with culture. New states might deliberately use laws as an instrument 
of modernization, of nation-building, or of authority.88 Where the deep religiosity of 
the people within a particular state clashed with the desire of the state to impose a single 
form of marriage, the result might be opposition and swift repeal, grudging acceptance, 
or the continuance of religious ceremonies with no formal recognition.  
 
As this chapter has shown, while the pace and extent of change varied between different 
legal cultures, there was a very clear shift towards according a greater role to state laws. 
This process was only accelerated by the First World War. Henceforth the state was to 
play a far greater role in the regulation of everyday life, and it is no coincidence that 
two of the Empires within which marriage law had changed very little over the previous 
century—the Russian and the Ottoman—both made changes to their marriage laws in 
1917.  
 
While the move to greater regulation by the state has brought greater certainty, this has 
been at the expense of making compliance with certain stipulated formalities the 
touchstone of what makes a marriage that will be recognised by the state. But even the 
most innocuous-seeming regulations as to notice and registration are not value-neutral. 
The often unintended effects of the laws of marriage upon individuals has long 
engendered a debate—one which continues down to the present day, with widespread 
cohabitation outside formal marriage and the modern practice of religious-only 
marriages—as to whether this focus on formalities offers sufficient protection to those 
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